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Abstract 
Spain was not admitted to the then European Economic Community during the Franco’s regime for 
political reasons.  Joining the EU on January 1986 was the last and final step forward towards the definitive 
consolidation of  democracy in Spain and the consolidation of the opening of the Spanish Economy. 
The results over the first twenty five years of membership have translated into an unprecedented boost of 
modernization and progress. Spain adopted the “Acquis Communautaire” and received considerable 
benefits from EU membership, eliminating barriers, following the common policies , re ceiving European 
funds and adopting the European common currency . From an index of 60 per cent of the European income 
average in 1986, today’s income –even after the crisis that started in 2008- is in the range of 105 per cent.  
The last three years have been different and difficult due to the severe economic and financial crisis. In this 
context, this paper analyses how the successive Spanish governments organized the economic governance 
to adapt to the quantitative and qualitative changes registered in the European Integration. 
            Resumen 
España no fue admitida en la Comunidad Económica Europea durante el régimen de Franco por razones 
políticas. Integrarse  a la Comunidad Europea en enero de 1986 fue el último  peldaño hacia la 
consolidación definitiva de la  democracia en España y de la apertura de su economía.. 
Los resultados de los veinticinco años como miembro de la UE se han traducido en un  impulso  sin 
precedentes de modernización y progreso. España adoptó el “Acervo Comunitario” y recibió considerables 
beneficios de su integración a la Comunidad, eliminando barreras, siguiendo las políticas comunes, 
recibiendo fondos europeos y adoptando la moneda europea común. A partir de un nivel del 60% del 
promedio europeo de renta per capita en 1986, el nivel actual –incluso con la crisis que estalló en 2008-  
se sitúa en torno al 105 por ciento.  
Los últimos tres años han sido diferentes y difíciles como consecuencia de la severa crisis económica y 
financiera.En este contexto este trabajo analiza como los sucesivos gobiernos de España han organizado la 
gobernanza económica  para adaptarla a los cambios cuantitativos y cualitativos que se han ido 
produciendo en la integración europea. 
 Codes JEL: F15, F36, H12, H50,  K33, L74, N94 
Keywords:European Integration,  European Union- Spain  relations,   European Economic and Monetary 
Union,  ,  National Government Expenditure and Debt,  Euro-crisis 
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Introduction: The 1970 Spain-EEC agreement 
The  EEC was a crucial partner for the Spanish economy. As early as 1962. Franco’s 
Government expressed interest in an association with the EEC, possibly leading to eventual full 
membership. Integration was not possible for political reasons, but a Preferential Trade 
Agreement Spain-EEC, similar to the EC-Israel Agreement, was signed on June 29, 1970. 
This Agreement known as Ullastres Agreement (named after the then Spanish 
ambassador to the EC and former Minister for Trade) provided the framework for the 
asymmetrical progressive elimination of trade barriers between Spain and the six member 
countries of the EEC at that time (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands) 
(Granell 1973). This Agreement was challenged by the introduction of the Generalized System of 
Preferences by the EEC in 1971(Donges 1976) and was extended to the new EC members after 
the First Enlargement of the EC (in 1973) and the Second Enlargement (Greece in1981). Between 
1970 and 1984, the volume of Spanish exports to the EC grew in real terms by 355% paving the 
way for Spain's formal accession when the political developments in Spain made it possible: after 
Franco´s death in 1975 and after the first democratic elections1. 
 
 The logic of the membership to the European Community 
Since the fall of their respective dictatorships in the middle of the 1970s, countries such as 
Greece, Portugal and Spain experienced a spectacular transformation into democracies that 
enabled   them to apply for membership in the European Community, which they regarded as the 
final step on the road back to the heart of Europe (Círculo de Economía 1973). Greece applied for 
membership in the EC on June 12, 1975; Portugal applied on March 28, 1977 and Spain on July 
28 of the same year.  In order to consolidate democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain, the EC 
approved a Second Enlargement (the first one occurred in 1973 and comprised Denmark, Ireland 
                                                 
1
 Francesc Granell, "A los 25 años del Plan de Estabilización”,  El País, July  27,1984 
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and UK) based on article 98 of the ECSC Treaty, 237 of the EEC Treaty, and 205 of the 
EURATOM Treaty.  
Negotiations for membership with Greece opened in July 1976, Portugal followed in 
October 1978, and Spain in February 1979. Greece became a full member of the EC in 1981 but 
the EC-Spain and EC-Portugal negotiations experienced a delay, and membership was only 
possible in 1986, following the ratification of the accession Treaty signed in Lisbon and Madrid 
on June 12, 1985 (Granell 1985). 
 
In Spain, the negotiations for entry were supported with enthusiastic political 
determination in spite of the skepticism among certain economic sectors concerning the lack of 
competitiveness of Spanish industry to face the opening of the economy. Sustained growth in the 
Sixties defused social conflict with the credible promise of higher incomes and better social 
mobility in the future. It is likely that the possibility of European integration reinforced the 
expectations of Spaniards about sustained growth in the future. In 1974, Spain attained a per 
capita income above US$7,000 compared to US$2,000 in 1930. The rapid transformation of 
Spain in the Sixties had generated a strong middle class that secured popular support for 
democratization and membership of the EC after Franco's death (Gunther, Montero, Botella 
2004).      
 On the eve of membership in 1984, Spain had a relatively low level of foreign trade. The 
value of Spain’s exports amounted to some US$23.5 billion and her imports to some 28.8 billion. 
Imports per capita amounted to US$764 while the equivalent figures were US$1,919 for France, 
US$1,414 for Italy, US$1,775 for United Kingdom and US$1,061 for Japan. The situation in 
terms of exports per capita was less favorable still amounting to US$519 while Italy had 
US$1,281 and France US$1,667.  In terms of sectoral structure, Spain presented an image of an 
underdeveloped country regarding the composition of exports to developed countries and it 
presented the image of a developed country considering the trade flows to developing countries. 
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In 1984, 33.4% of Spanish imports came from the then ten members of the EC while the ten 
members of the EC imported 49.1 of Spanish exports in the same year. During the same year 50% 
of foreign investment attracted by Spain came from the EC’s ten members and most of the 
US$1.2 billion remittances of Spanish migrants working abroad came from the EC. In addition, 
80% of the yearly tourist income of US$7 billion earned by Spain was spent by EC nationals 
(Granell 1985). In 1984 the number of foreigners working in Spain was relatively small. Spanish 
companies had a very low level of investments abroad and the tourist expenditure made by 
Spaniards abroad was very low. 
 
The Terms of Membership to the EC  
In order to start membership negotiations (1979-85), the Spanish Government accepted  the 
principle of adopting  Community rules, principles and institutions (Acquis Communautaire), 
recognizing that the negotiations should focus on transitional arrangements (Nin 1980). For the 
purpose of the negotiations and the adoption of arrangements for the transitional period, the 
Acquis Communautaire had been divided into 19 chapters. As a result of the accession 
negotiations, a period of seven years was established for dismantling industrial trade barriers. 
During this period Spain also adopted the EC’s External Customs Tariff and the EC Foreign 
Commercial Policy including the Lomé Convention and the Generalized System of Trade 
Preferences (Navarro, Alberto in Westendorp 1994). The transitional period allowed for 
agricultural products was ten years, following a complicated negotiation largely because French 
farmers who feared competition from Spain's Mediterranean agricultural products. During the 
negotiations, Spain accepted to put its State monopolies in line with EC requirements and also 
accepted the EC's competition rules. Spaniards already working in the EC countries received the 
same rights as nationals of EC countries. Spain adopted the Value Added Tax from 1986. Spain 
also accepted that Spanish trucks and buses would be obliged under tachometric controls in three 
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to four years. More freedom for capital movements and international settlements had also been 
agreed. Spain also accepted the EC's environmental rules (Tamames 1999).    
  The adoption of the EEC's Common Customs Tariff  reduced to one-fifth the protection 
granted by the Spanish Customs Tariff. The reduction in tariff protection passed from 20% to 4%. 
The EC's Tariff combined with the GSP, the ACP special relations and other agreements opened 
Spain not only to the European market but to the rest of the world as well, having an impact on 
some domestic sectors of production that was more important than the impact produced by the 
high added value products from other EC members not directly competing with Spanish 
production. The introduction of VAT changed the traditional Spain’s system of export subsidies 
and forced central and regional governments and other bodies, like the Chambers of Commerce, 
to be much more active in promoting exports to improve the performance of the Spanish 
economy, and to try to reduce the trade gap. Some declining and non-competitive industries 
suffered from the enhanced competition from foreign products due to cheaper imports. 
 In the field of external relations, a specific issue that Spain sought to introduce into the 
accession negotiations was the need for the EC to establish special relations with the Latin-
American countries with which Spain had no special tariff or trade policy arrangements at that 
time (Granell 1985). The question of the relations with Latin America dramatically changed    
years later not only because of an increase in trade relations, but because of the vastly increased 
number of Latin-American  immigrants that come to work in Spain and the  enormous amount  of  
investment in Latin America by Spanish multinational companies created  by  privatization of  
old monopoly companies in the field of  utilities  (Telefónica, Repsol, Iberia, Endesa…) or by  
diversification of banking business (Santander-Central Hispano, BBVA). Most of these 
investments were at least in part a consequence of the  increased competition, the bigger firms 
resulting from the mergers and acquisitions to achieve economies of scale and later in order to 
complete effectively following in the introduction of the euro. Spain also became involved in EC 
development assistance to poor countries (Granell 1991 and Navarro in Westendorp 1994).   
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 The initial effects of joining the EC in static terms were unfavorable to Spain in terms of 
balance of trade, even if in the Treaty of Accession Spanish industry obtained advantageous 
treatment, except in certain sensitive sectors such as car production and iron and steel. With the 
phasing out of tariffs, there was both trade creation and the trade diversion which affected 
agricultural imports from United States and Latin America. This led the EC to compensate the 
countries affected in the framework of the rules of the GATT. 
  Nevertheless, the overall effect on Spain of joining the EC was highly positive in 
dynamic terms. One factor was the integration of Spanish Industry into the European networking 
of intra-industry trade in added value products. Another factor was the flow of foreign investment 
into Spain both from Europe and from other countries, mainly USA and Japan, as well as the 
European transfers of funds to increase the revenue of the farmers and for investment in 
infrastructure. But some of the dynamic effects were still to come, resulting from the European 
growth after the 1983-85 economic crisis, and from the creation of new European instruments and 
policies for developing European regions that were introduced after Jacques Delors became 
president of the European Commission in 1985. 
 
The consequences of membership for Spain 
 
Comparing with the low growth in 1983-85, the 1986-1991 years had been globally positive for 
the Spanish economy making it easier for the country to adapt to EC rules (Almarcha 1993). The 
Socialist  Party came to power  at the end of 1982 and at the time of presenting the 
Macroeconomic Convergence Program with the EC in April 1992 there was much pride in the 
economic performance of the Spanish Economy and even in the new policy of privatization  in 
1983 (Rumasa). This success came at the price of an increase in the public debt from 31.4% of 
GNP to 47.1% in the period 1982-95, increasing to 68.2% in the last year of Socialist Party rule 
(1996).    
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 Since EC membership, Spain has actively participated in the Community policy process 
guiding the process of European integration during four six-month periods of Spanish Presidency 
(three under the socialist government: January/June 1989; July/December 1995 and January/June 
2010 and one under the Popular Party government: January/June 2002) (Granell 2010). At the 
same time, Spanish representatives occupied top jobs in the EU's institutions and  Spain 
supported the development of the EC integration in quantitative terms (enlargements), qualitative 
terms (for development of community policies)  and in the efficiency of the European institutions 
(Viñas 2006).  
 Since 1986, Spain has been one of the most pro-European countries and it has always 
been in favor of deeper EU integration. In this sense, Felipe González cooperated closely with 
Helmut Kohl, François Miterrand and Jacques Delors, helping to make possible one of the most 
creative periods in the history of European integration (González 2010).  At the same time, Spain 
did not oppose enlargement where new members were prepared to share the entire EU Acquis, 
and if European Member States were prepared to accept an increase in the European Budget for 
financing underdeveloped European regions (Solbes 2002). 
 Prime Minister Felipe González attended the European Council meeting held in Milan in 
June 1985 as his first important European engagement after the signing of the Accession Treaty 
and before the ratification of membership. Gonzalez  endorsed the White Paper of  Jacques 
Delors  introducing the idea of creating a Single Internal Market by 1992 eliminating non tariff, 
legal and administrative obstacles still impeding the free movement of labor and capital, goods 
and services in the "Twelve" (including Spain and Portugal). The Single European Act that the 
Single Market program included provisions on European political cooperation, developed the idea 
of economic and social cohesion and further advanced the European Monetary System (EMS) 
which the Spanish peseta joined under its first Presidency of the Council in June 19, 1989.  
 The decision for the peseta to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism - with a central parity 
of  pesetas 65 per deutschemark  and a fluctuation band of 6% - was linked to the need to show to 
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other countries that Spain was a credible partner with an effective anti-inflation policy.  The move 
strengthened the peseta due to an increase in capital inflows which were responding to the high 
Spanish interest rate differentials with other ERM currencies. However, as a result of persistent 
inflation and a fixed exchange rate inside the ERM, companies became less competitive, 
negatively affecting competitiveness and leading to successive devaluations in September 1992 
(5%), November 1992 (6%), May 1993 (8%) and March 1995 (7%).      
 After the ratification of the European Single Act on July 1, 1987   Spain sought to 
introduce more flexibility into its economy and was able to introduce three hundred measures 
required to increase freedom of movement under the Single Market program (Viñals 1992).  The 
adoption of EU regulations or transposing the directives has been a continuous process not always 
easy on Spanish companies, especially as a consequence of  the economic recession that began in 
1992-93, immediately after the  Barcelona Olympic Games, the Seville World Expo and the 
award of European Cultural Capital to Madrid.     
As well as the Single Market, other factors helped to promote Spanish convergence with 
the European average income levels: the introduction of common currency and low interest rates, 
the increase of the budgetary appropriations of funds for the poorer regions of the member States 
in order to enable them to cope better with the increased competition that was expected from the 
removal of internal barriers in the EC, resources for Research, Education, etc. 
 The step in the integration process that came with the Treaty on the European Union 
(TEU) signed in Maastricht in February 1992 enlarged substantially the scope of the European 
integration introducing new economic policies, a political second pillar and a Justice and Internal 
affairs pillar. Spanish Ambassador Carlos Westendorp was a key player in the negotiation of the 
TEU (Westendorp 1994). Among other things the TEU opened the way to Economic and 
Monetary Union with a European Central Bank, established the criteria for new membership and 
the macroeconomic convergence criteria required for the introduction of a common currency (the 
“euro” according to the decision taken at the European Council held in Madrid in December 
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1995). Spain was concerned to beexcluded as a part of the Economic and Monetary Union since 
its inception. For that reason, Spain requested during the Intergovernmental Conference on EMU, 
a long transition period and insisted on the principle that the largest possible number of Member 
States should participate from the start. Spain accepted the Maastricht Treaty provisions on 
macroeconomic convergence criteria having in mind that the most likely date for the third stage 
of EMU (the introduction of the euro) to start would be 1999. During this period, Spain’s record 
regarding the macroeconomic convergence criteria established by the Maastricht Treaty was not 
satisfactory. Spain faced the risk of not participating in the third stage of EMU. 
 Spain also supported other elements of the new TEU: the concept of “subsidiary”, the 
notion of an EU citizenship and the establishment of the new Committee of the Regions to 
formalize consultation with the local and regional authorities. The creation of the Committee of 
Regions was especially welcomed by Spanish local and regional Governments. They also 
welcomed the explicit definition of subsidiary even if the concept written in Article 3b of the 
TEU referred only to relations between the EU institutions and national governments. This 
concept was only more precisely defined, together with the principle of proportionality, in the 
European Council meeting held in Edinburgh in December 1992 (then incorporated to the 
Amsterdam Treaty signed on June 1997). In this sense, it is important to recall that almost in 
parallel with EU membership, Spain’s Constitution of 1978 formally recognized 17 Autonomous 
Communities. The devolution of powers to regional governments has changed the balance of 
power between the central and regional government.  
 At the same time, the new political environment that followed the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 led to a process of German unification for which Helmut Kohl found in Felipe 
González a strong ally at the EC level2. Partly as a result of this support, Kohl accepted the 
Spanish request for more resources for cohesion policy and for the establishment of a cohesion 
                                                 
2Commission des Communautés Européennes (1990): “La Communauté Européenne et l’unification allemande” 
in Bulletin des Communautés Européennes, Supplément 4/90   
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fund under the so-called Delors II Financial Package that was agreed in the European Council 
held in Edinburgh in December 1992 (Molle 2007). 
 Regarding a possible enlargement of the EC, accepting into the EC certain EFTA/EEE 
countries, the first mention of this possibility was made by the EC's European Council held in 
Maastricht in December 1991. Spain accepted from the beginning the request presented by EFTA 
countries, provided that they were ready to accept in full the European Acquis that also included 
the acceptance by the candidates not only of the traditional EC acquis but also of the extensions 
deriving from the Single European Act and the Treaty of European Union. Spain insisted in two 
other pre-conditions: the ratification of the TUE before enlargement and the approval of the 
Financial Perspectives 1993-99  needed for Spain to receive important EU funds . Regarding 
voting rules in the Council in their initial position, both Spain and the UK wanted to maintain the 
number of votes required for a blocking minority on decisions to 23 instead of raising it to 27. 
The issue was only settled by the so-called Ionnina Compromise of March 1994. The Greek 
presidency said:"The EU should not have undertaken new responsibilities before the Community 
structure deepens, before we proceed to necessary structural and economic changes, before we 
satisfy the preconditions set by the Maastricht Treaty" (Granell 1995). During the subsequent 
enlargement negotiations, Spain feared that with the arrival of new member states in 1995, the 
likelihood of starting a third stage of EMU before 1999 would have been increased and 
consequently Spain would face a higher risk of not being ready to join the first group of countries. 
If Spain had been left outside the leading group of countries, it would have appeared as a major 
failure for the Socialist government. In this context, at the EU Foreign Affairs Council of 
December 1993, Spain requested that the candidate countries (at that time Austria, Finland, 
Sweden and Norway) should be excluded from decisions concerning the passage to the third stage 
of EMU due to be taken in 1996. 
After the 1995 enlargement that brought Austria, Finland and Sweden into the EU, with 
the full support of Spain, some concerns arose (already present during the second Spanish 
12 
 
Presidency of the Council in the second semester of 1995) about the efficacy of the EU’s 
institutions and about migration policy which were subsequently addressed, among others, in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on October 2, 1997. When the Treaty came into effect on May 1, 
1999, it provided several amendments to the Treaty of Maastricht. To resolve personal security 
and immigration issues, the EU was allowed to legislate on civil law. The Treaty also bestowed 
more power upon the Parliament in the legislative process, and it raised the possibility—albeit 
under strict conditions—for “closer cooperation” between selected member states. Links between 
criminal justice systems in the member states were also intensified. A High Representative for 
EU Foreign Policy was introduced, in a bid to bolster the Union’s international profile, and to 
help to project European values in the outside world. The former Spanish Foreign Minister and 
former NATO General Secretary, Javier Solana was appointed as the first High Representative 
for the CFSP (Solana 2010). However, the majority of the Amsterdam Treaty amendments served 
to tighten the political bond between the Union and the citizen. Perhaps resulting from these 
measures, in a late 2000 survey, 76% of the Spanish population admitted to feeling “European,” 
compared to 60% in the rest of the EU. 
 The question of the conduct of the economy to enter in EMU had been important in the 
last years of the González Socialist government and the first years of the Aznar conservative 
government after the March 1996 legislative elections (Cuadrado 1996 and Muns 1997). In fact, 
Aznar came to power promising to fight corruption and illegal practices and to fight against ETA 
terrorism (GAL) while promising more economic liberalism including tax cuts3. However, only a 
few months after he became prime minister many of his intentions were abandoned because of 
the need to prepare for the Single European currency.  This was at a time of high unemployment 
(23%) and both domestic demand and consumer spending were stagnant. There was a general 
                                                 
3
 The Economist:” The World in 1997”, December 1996. 
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fear that austerity policies demanded by macroeconomic convergence criteria could push the 
country into recession.  
Due to some improvement in the economic situation, Spain in the end met the 
convergence criteria, making it possible to join the leading group of countries entering into the 
euro on January 1, 1999. Although interest rates were no longer to be set in Madrid in a Spanish 
economic policy context, full participation in the euro has never been a divisive issue even during 
the euro crisis of 2009-2010. In fact, the adoption of the euro has been described as creating a 
virtuous circle for the Spanish economy (Elias 2001). In the Davos meeting of 2000, Aznar called 
the euro "a great European success that had brought stability, integration and prosperity"4 
 In the assessment of the updated convergence program for Spain in February 2000, it was 
pointed out that the macroeconomic projections  for 1999-2003 were in line  with the 
requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines agreed 
at the Cardiff European Council (June 1998). After the successful application by the Popular 
Party of the Convergence Program 1994-97, Spain achieved international recognition of success 
in economic management in December 2001 by being considered as a country with the highest 
debt rating "AAA” by Moody’s Investors services.  The Aznar government introduced a Fiscal 
Stability Law in 2003 that was stricter than the EU Stability and Growth Pact and together with 
more fiscal austerity the Debt/GDP ratio fell to 55.8% in 2003 with economic growth near 4%, 
thus helping in the effort to reduce the GDP gap with other EU countries. Only the inflation rate 
exceeded the required target of 2% (Garmendia 2004).  
 Against a backdrop of an world economy growing , Aznar enhanced the Spanish position 
in the EU through a series of reforms that transformed Spain into one of the more robust 
economies. This included reforms in the tax system and labor market and the privatization of 
public companies (Telefónica, Endesa, Repsol, Tabacalera, Argentaria, Iberia) generating 
                                                 
4
 Alan Friedman:” Fear of the Future in Europe? Spanish leader attacks economic Intervention Policies”, 
International Herald Tribune, January 31,2000.  
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revenues to reduce the debt burden while reducing the weight of the state companies in the stock 
market to a less than 0.5%. 
 Bolstered by Spain's strong economy, Aznar urged his European neighbors to abandon 
government intervention in the economy (increased taxes, 35-hour working week and so on) and 
called for building an "economically powerful Europe". Together with Tony Blair he emerged 
triumphant from the EU European Council in Nice on December 2000 because, in the 
reweighting of votes decided in view of the Nice Treaty, Britain and Spain gained more weight 
while succeeding in protecting their national vetoes in the key areas: for UK, taxes and social 
security, and, for Spain in decisions governing the allocation of future “cohesion funds", the 
source of some €11 billion in EU subsidies per year to Spain between 2000 and 2006. 
 Even if the budgetary flows between Brussels and Madrid probably have a marginal 
importance in the framework of the EU/Spain relations because the EU budget is relatively small 
compared to National and Regional budgets in Spain5, the question is highly political, however, 
in view of the fact that public opinion considered that Spain had to be financially compensated for 
opening its market to imports from more advanced European partners, for supporting the 
significant effort in investment in infrastructures after accession, for converting regions and 
sectors affected by globalization, for fighting against unemployment and for adapting Spanish 
Agriculture under the Common Agricultural Policy.  
The next Treaty of Accession signed in Athens (April 2003), which admitted ten new 
countries in the EU on 2005 (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta) and the Luxemburg Treaty (April 2005) bringing Bulgaria and 
Romania to the Union on 2007, called for another period of adjustments.  
Regarding the management of the Spanish Economy, the enlargement to 27 meant that 
Spain saw certain industries delocalizing. Spain also moved to become a net contributor to the EU 
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 Aurora Gallego, “Saldo financiero España-UE en 2009”,  Boletín Información Comercial Española, num. 3002, 
December 2010 
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budget (Roy 2006).  This did not seem to concern the Spanish public opinion convinced by Prime 
Minister Rodríguez Zapatero that the Spanish economy was going up and up and did not need the 
same level of European regional and cohesion funds. 
After the non-ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, the Berlin Declaration of March 
25, 2007, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, renewed the impetus for 
major institutional and policy reform, which would soon be realized in the Treaty of Lisbon6. 
Spain, together with Luxemburg, had a pivotal role in the transposition of the un-ratified 
Constitutional Treaty into the new Treaty of Lisbon7 that was agreed by the member states on 
December 13, 2007, effective on December 1, 2009, amending the existing treaties and 
dismantling the three pillars structure (Piris 2010). Although Spain was the 23rd (fourth to last) 
country to ratify the Treaty, it did so with an overwhelming majority in both the Senate and lower 
house of Parliament, and this in a context of economic crisis. The Treaty received the backing of 
Prime Minister Zapatero and his PSOE party, as well as that of the Popular Party. The Treaty of 
Lisbon also declared the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European (previously ratified on 
December 7,  2000) legally sound. The Charter proclaimed the rights of all EU citizens in areas 
such as equality, solidarity, rights and justice, in a move that PSOE considered very close to their 
interests and electoral social promises. 
Finally, it is necessary to recall that Spain chaired the rotating presidency of the Council 
of the EU (the 4th presidency since membership) during the first semester of 2010 (Granell 2010). 
This meant that during their presidency Spain was responsible for implementing, along with the 
other European institutions, all the changes in the governance of the UE introduced by the Treaty 
of Lisbon in a very stormy period, characterized the  Debt crisis in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
in other countries. During the Presidency, life was complicated for Spain because of some 
                                                 
6
  Francesc Granell, “Del intento de Constitución Europea al Tratado de Reforma”, Economía Exterior, num  42,       
Autumn 2007. 
7
 Navarro, Alberto and Schmit,N., “Por una Europa mejor”, El País, January 27,2007  
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apparent decline in the image and prestige of the EU linked to the euro crisis8. The full impact on 
Spain’s position regarding the EU in this period is difficult to assess, but observers around Europe 
feel that the Spain’s place in Europe looks weaker than before at the eve of general elections of 
November 20.2011 in which the Socialist Party was defeated. 
 
 
 
The economic impact of membership 
Between 1985 and 2007, Spain's output growth was very fast (except in the period that followed 
the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona, the World Exhibition in Sevilla and the Madrid European 
Cultural capital) due to various factors only in part associated with membership to EU. Between 
1986 and the year before the creation of the euro (1998), Spain had an average yearly growth of 
3.1% rising in some years to nearly 5%, the fastest in the OECD. The initial twenty-one years of 
Spain’s involvement in the European Union were therefore a period of economic good fortune, 
leading to many improvements in the country from major construction in infrastructure, to the 
unemployment rate falling from 18% to 10%.  Spain became the 8th largest economy in the world 
(Piedrafita 2007). Between 1985 and 1990 , when Spain received a massive inflow of foreign 
investments and EU funds , the country had the highest rate of job creation in the OECD, the 
industrial base was broadened and  Spain ranked first in the OECD in terms of per capita GDP 
growth.In 1991  Spain’s per capita  GDP was 79,8 per cent of the EU average. Spain came third –
after Switzerland and Germany – in The Economist’s  1993 ranking of the most attractive 
countries to live in.  
 Spain also improved its weight within the EU economy moving from 8% of the Union’s 
GDP to 9.7%.  Between 2000 and 2006, Spain provided more than half of the new jobs within the 
                                                 
8
  Stelzer,Irwin, Euro-zone song is an ode to indecisión, The Wall Street Journal, December 20,2010 
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25 Years of Spain in Europe: governments  of  
    F. González(1986-96), J.M. Aznar (1996-2004) and J.L.R. Zapatero (2004-2011) 
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EU. Spain, in the past a country of emigration, became a net receiver of millions of foreign 
workers. Spanish multinational companies and banks expanded around the World, mainly Latin 
America. The Spanish economy expanded by 64.6% in the first twenty years of its membership, 
while the rest of the EU averaged an increase of 47.9%.  Incomes in Spain rose from 71% of the 
average income in the EU 15, to more than 90% in 2006. Inflation fell to only one point above 
that of the euro zone, an impressive feat considering it was originally six points above the 
average.  Public spending experienced a major increase from 25% of Spain’s GDP in 1978, to 
reach 40% in 2006.  Motorways developed as well: from 2,000 kilometers in 1985 to 10,000 
kilometers in 2002.  This greatly improved communication and cut costs in goods and services.  
The beneficial additions to the infrastructure sector also greatly improved the tourism industry, 
which in 2006 accounted for 12% of GDP and 10% of employment. Still, despite this growth, 
Spain did not benefit in all aspects of its economy in the initial years of membership. Some 
sectors remained stagnant and in need of improvement. High-technology production is one of the 
fields where Spain has had a notable stagnation.  
Further signs of stagnation can be found in the productivity rate.  Though employment 
had increased, productivity remained constant.  This means that less work in terms of added value 
was being done per person. Two contributing factors to this stagnation were the greater use of 
temporary and more precarious contracts for workers, and an insufficient use of new 
technologies.  Temporary contracts can boost employment; however, with staff rotating 
frequently, workers may not receive proper training or integrate fully into the work force and are 
thus unable to use newer, more complicated technologies.  The question of unemployment is a 
constant issue to be solved  in Spain. Jacques Delors, the former President of the European 
Commission drove home this point when he told the European Council  in Copenhagen in June 
1993 that while the EU’s economy expanded 73% in real terms between 1970 and 1992 and 
employment rose 7 per cent , Spain registered the highest growth (93 per cent) although its level 
of employment declined 2 per cent (Chislett,1994). 
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 Technological development has tended to lag behind the rest of the European Union: for 
every 100 patents filed by the average EU nation, Spain files only 18.  This is largely due to the 
fact that Spain falls far behind the rest of Europe in spending on Research and Development.  
Spain’s investment in R&D accounted for only 1.07% of its GDP, whereas the European Union’s 
average was 1.95% of GDP.  Technological development is a significant challenge against the 
background of the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategy in which  the EU  aimed to make 
the EU’s economy “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, 
capable of sustaining economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.”   
More recently much of the favorable statistics on the initial twenty-one years of 
membership have shifted within Spain.  The recession has exposed some of the weaknesses in 
Spanish development, some of which can be traced to involvement within the European Union. 
Certain industries have suffered greatly as a result of the recession, and Spain’s ties to the 
European Union through the euro are probably inhibiting a recovery. Some Spanish savings 
banks – which account for 42% of the country’s banking assets – are in difficulty following the 
collapse of the decade-long housing boom, which has left them a large volume of bad loans and 
potentially heavy losses World9. 
 At the same time the Vicepresident and Minister of Economy  of the Zapatero’s 
government Elena Salgado pointed out erroneously that Spain’s Banks arent’t going Bust  and on  
the Contrary, Madrid’s financial sector reforms are a model for Europe and for the World10 
 The construction industry symbolizes the problems of the Spanish economy. Between 
1995 and 2008 Spanish house prices tripled in nominal terms, and doubled in real terms. This was 
explained by young people leaving the parental homes earlier, a rise in immigration, the country's 
popularity among European buyers of secondary residences, low interest rates for mortgages and 
                                                 
9
 Sara Schaeffer Muñoz,S and  Jonathan House,” Spain steps in again to help savings banks”, The Wall Street 
Journal,  January 20, 2011.   
10
 Elena Salgado: “Spain’s Banks are going Bust”, The Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2011.  
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generous fiscal incentives to buy a house.  Spain’s construction industry accounted for 12% of its 
Gross Domestic Product.  It brought in immigrants seeking work and provided lending and 
borrowing opportunities in the private sector.  Over a decade, land prices rose by 500%; in 2007 
construction led to an addition of 800,000 housing units.  However, when the bubble burst, this 
contributed to an unemployment rate of around 20% and forced some immigrants that had 
originally found work in Spain to return home11.   
The first reaction of the Socialist government to the crisis was to spend more in order to 
stimulate the economy and to continue social expenditure to preserve social peace.  This effort in 
expenditure and the reduction of tax revenues due to the decrease of economic activity led to an 
increase in the public deficit for the central and regional governments. Financing the debt on the 
international markets was a challenge against a background of indecision and uncertainty in the 
handling of the European euro crisis12. This led to an increase in prices to be paid for debt issued 
by the Ministry of Finance of the Government of the “Kingdom of Spain” and by the Regional 
Governments13.  However, according to the analysis of Goldman Sachs in a recent study, Spanish 
public debt is unlikely to exceed 90% at the peak, hardly a case of insolvency and reducing the 
risk of a liquidity crisis that might force Spain to seek external assistance similar to the so-called 
bailouts of Greece. Portugal and Ireland. In addition, concluded that Spain's gross government 
debt stood at 64% of GDP, well below the levels of Portugal (83%), Ireland (97%) and Greece 
(140%), with a "prospective burden debt" similar to those of "safe” France and Germany today14.  
In May 2010 Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, at last, changed economic 
policy and declared that painful cuts would be needed in the Spanish Welfare State15. 
                                                 
11
 Suzanne Daley and Raphael Minder: “Newly built towns haunt banks in Spain”, New York Times, Dec, 17,2010. 
12
 Marcus Walker and Neil Shah. "Spain hit with Credit downgrade", The Wall Street Journal, April 29, 2010  
13
  Joseph Stiglitz,“Stiglitz alerta a España de una posible crisis a la argentina”, El Economista, 4 Oct 2010 
14
  Irwin Stelzer : Spain can still avoid financial doom The Wall Street Journal, January 24,2011. 
15
 Financial Times Special Report.  “Spain.After the bust, a time for adjustment”, June 11, 2010 
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Taking account of budgetary legal limits and the requirements of the European Pact for 
Stability and Growth, and seeing the reality of the situation in the markets for debt (and after talks 
with the European Commission, the European central Bank and the IMF) Spain was forced to 
curb public spending 16.  In this context the government set out a program of reform to reduce the 
11.1% budget deficit in 2009 to 9.3% in 2010 and 6% in 2011, reforming social security and 
pensions, freezing salaries in the public sector, increasing VAT normal rate from 16% to 18% and 
increasing other taxes. The Trade unions immediately reacted with a general strike held on 
September 29, 2010.  
At the same time the Spanish Parliament agreed upon in August to introduce a 
Constitutional Change to limit budget deficits with the full support of the Socialist and the 
People’s Party that was on the opposition benches at that time.    
Even if Spanish Socialist government officials said that the worst of the crisis was over, 
the People’s Party , international organizations and many independent experts remained 
skeptical17. In fact contradictory forecasts about the economic perspectives of growth indicate 
how difficult it is to predict the course of the downturn that is battering the Spanish Economy and 
how difficult is to give credit to the Keynesian ideas about the role of stimulus spending in 
boosting economic growth, or to focus on repairing the financial system and to curb public 
expenditure.  
The construction industry’s rate of expansion in Spain was one of the important 
components of the growth. Spain had the largest number of mortgages per capita, and was the 
most “overbuilt” country in the European Union. But prices since the recession have dropped the 
least.  Making matters worse is that the scale of unsold units, and mortgage problems among 
households, is so great that the banks are unable to produce accurate data and statistics to 
                                                 
16
  Francesc Granell. "La crisis griega como referente para España",Catalunya Empresarial, April-May 2010 
17
  José María Aznar, ”What's wrong with Spain”, The Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2010. 
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demonstrate how severe the problem is.  Some believe that banks are withholding mortgages 
putting up additional property for sale in the fear that it will continue to hurt real estate prices.    
During the period of prosperity that Spain experienced up to 2007-08, prices and wages 
rose rapidly which, though were temporarily beneficial, caused a large trade deficit and a growing 
increase in the external debt required to finance the current account imbalance. Following the 
bursting of the bubble, Spain was left with unit production costs that seriously damaged its 
competitiveness within the European Union. The large fall in employment partly reflected 
attempts by firms to rationalize production in the face of strong labor cost pressures in an effort to 
become more competitive abroad.  
It would not necessarily help for Spain to leave the euro that it adopted in 1999 and 
devalue. For example, Spain needs to import more advanced technology from abroad and that 
would cost more with a depreciated currency. Investors might begin to transfer their money out of 
Spanish banks to other European banks in order not to lose the strength of the euro. But the same 
euro that during ten years contributed to the strong development of Spain is presently trapping 
Spain in a high-cost situation, which is contributing to the persistence of high unemployment18.  
According the European Commission the Spain’s GDP  had only increased  at a rate of 
0.9% in 2008  and 0.7% in 2011, while declined  at 3.7% in 2009 and 0.1% in 2011. At the end of 
2011 the rate of Unemployment reached 21% and the Public Debt rose to 69.6% of the GDP from 
40.1% in 2008. The Rating Agencies are very negative about the  Public and Private Debt of 
Spain and that is not helping to tackle with the Structural Reforms needed at the end of the 25th 
anniversary of the Spain’s Membership to the EU.  
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Paul Krugman,” The Spanish Prisoner”,  New York Times, November 28, 2010 
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The future economic governance of Spain  with the People’s  Party’s Rajoy Government 
The last three years have shown that continuous prosperity for Spain within the European 
Union’s economy is uncertain.  Weaknesses and problems with the system have been revealed; 
however, if Spain can restructure in order to weather the storm of the current crisis using the help 
that is available within the European Union, then it will certainly come out far stronger down the 
road as a result19. 
  Recessions help to show weaknesses and mistakes made by government, public bodies, 
banks and saving banks, and private industries. If Spain and the rest of the European Union can 
learn from these mistakes, then Spain and other weaker European countries are likely to see a 
return to the growth that they had enjoyed throughout the initial years as a member of EC and 
EU.  Spain and its European family have maintained a primarily beneficial relationship 
throughout twenty five years. This relation will hopefully resume after the present crisis has been 
overcome,  if the Administration is embarking on some serious signal-sending to convince the 
world that it’s  on the case and committed to at least keeping the deficit as a share of GDP to 
historically acceptable levels , with  the aid of the instruments of anti-crisis created by the EU 
during 2010 in order to create a permanent rescue fund that would come into being in 2013 and 
with the support of the European Central Bank  to provide liquidity to Spanish Banks and to buy 
Spanish Debt in the markets if the economic recovery is not advancing faster than expected. 
 This  ECB support would  also demonstrate the commitment of the European 
institutions,  Germany and France and all the euro zone countries to avoid the failure  of the euro 
as a political project. 20   
The Spanish government has criticized rating agencies for lowering the nation's credit 
rating. Meanwhile, Spanish Government launched a negotiation for a higher retirement age and 
                                                 
19
 The Economist ” The party's over”, Special Report, November 8, 2008 
20
 Francesc Granell , “La complicada modificación del Tratado de Lisboa”, Cuadernos de Información Económica 
FUNCAS, Nov-Dec 2010. 
24 
 
seeking to establish more flexible labor markets and a better connection between wages and 
productivity. At the same time, central and regional governments trying to balance their budgets 
and there is an ambitious program for aligning banks and savings banks with the requirements 
established by Basel Committee on Banking solvency. 
 Today the challenge is not only to solve the short-term budgetary and financial sector 
problems, but to create a more competitive economy based on a different growth model that 
promotes rising productivity and Employment. Spain needs to compete not only in Europe but 
also in the world markets to avoid a declining in its weight in the European and world economy. 
As the new Rajoy’s Government Minister of Economy and Competitiveness, Luis de 
Guindos, pointed out21 the Peoples’s Party’s Government economic Challenge is to develop a 
policy in which Fiscal Consolidation to offset the impact of the unexpected jump in the 2011 
public deficit to  8%,  must be matched with bold structural reforms to foster growth and  
Employment.  
The new Minister for Foreign Affairs and former Member of the European Parliament 
J.M. Garcia Margallo had declared that Spain will continue to act as a cooperative and loyal 
member of the European Union and described the reforms taken by the Rajoy’s Government at 
the end of 2011 as fully consistent with the new economic governance framework agreed upon at 
the EU level. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Luis de Guindos,  “ Our Plan for Reviving Spain” The Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2012 
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